Cool stuff. Though I've never quite understood how RPKI solves route hijacks. The article says it validates that you're allowed to announce a given prefix outright, but I thought the idea behind a BGP hijack was that you just say you have a good route towards a given prefix, and traffic flows through you as a result?
There's two kinds of route hijacks. Origin or path based.
RPKI addresses who is allowed to originate a prefix. There are other technical changes that need to be implemented to get path validation, this cloud flare blog has a good write up on the issues/solutions.
RPKI mainly makes the administrative side of the route database more formal and rigorous than previous internet routing registry implementations. The processes for using them to improve network security are discussed at https://manrs.org/
The RPKI fix is that any node in a rpki tree is signed by the certificate from the authority above it, all the way up until some root certificate that you trust.
So you cannot have some party hijacking a prefix, it would not be signed by its parent authority.
RPKI addresses who is allowed to originate a prefix. There are other technical changes that need to be implemented to get path validation, this cloud flare blog has a good write up on the issues/solutions.
https://blog.cloudflare.com/bgp-route-leak-venezuela/
https://blog.cloudflare.com/enforce-first-as-bgp/
They have a neat dashboard at https://observatory.manrs.org/